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Heavy intervention operations took place while conventional monetary policy instruments--interest rates and base money growth--were seemingly ineffective in stopping the Japanese deflation. The overnight interbank rate (collateralized overnight call rate) was lowered to virtually zero in early 1999 and remained close to that level, never rising above 1/2 percent, for more than five years. shown in Figure 3 , could be associated with the intensity and unprecedented magnitude of yen sales/dollar purchase foreign exchange intervention. One objective of our study is to investigate the response of the Bank of Japan to the shift in Ministry of Finance policy.
The next section provides some institutional details on foreign exchange market intervention operations in Japan. Section 3 reviews recent evidence on the effectiveness of Japanese foreign exchange market intervention and presents some new results on this topic. Section 4 presents evidence on the extent to which intervention operations have been sterilized. Section 5 discusses the broader question of how the Bank of Japan may have changed it's policy direction to accommodate heavy foreign-currency intervention purchases in 2003-04. Section 6 concludes the article.
Institutions
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) in Japan has responsibility for foreign exchange market policy 5 , though the Bank of Japan (BOJ) acts as its agent in carrying out the market operations by using an account of the government called the Foreign Exchange Fund Special Account (FEFSA) 6 . This fund consists of foreign currency funds and yen funds.
Financing Bills (FBs; short-term government bills) are issued by the MOF to the market to obtain yen funds for the FEFSA, that in turn is used to purchase the foreign currency denominated assets. 7 The financing bills (denominated in yen) are issued domestically to obtain yen funds before the foreign exchange purchase (yen sales), so in a technical sense the intervention is automatically sterilized 8 . Financial bills are rolled over, when foreign currency denominated assets are maintained as foreign reserves. Sales of the foreign currency denominated assets result in reducing outstanding financial bills by redemption upon maturity (usually 3 months). There are a number of categories of FBs and legal limits on both the overall amount of FBs outstanding as well as the category of FBs used for financing foreign exchange purchases ("Foreign Exchange Fund Financing Bills"). This is shown in Table 1 .
Japan has long been the most active participant in the foreign exchange market among the major industrial countries (Ito, 2003; Fatum and Hutchison, 2002) . However, a sharp departure with past policy--in terms of magnitude and frequency--started when Japan's interventions became much more active starting on January 15, 2003 and continuing for more than a year until March 16, 2004 (Ito, 2004 . During these four quarters, the MOF sold 35 trillion yen to purchase dollars. Dominguez, 2003; Dominguez and Frankel, 1993; Edison, 1993; ). In the context of this paper, five recent studies by Dominguez (2003) , Ito (2003 Ito ( , 2004 and Hutchison (2002, 2004) are of particular interest as all five investigate official BoJ intervention data at daily frequencies, employ very different methodologies in order to do so, yet arrive at quite similar conclusions.
10 Table 3 provides a brief overview of these studies' results on effectiveness of BoJ intervention. In order to assess the impact of BoJ intervention over the January 1991 Fatum and Hutchison (2002) find strong evidence that intervention systematically affects the exchange rate in the short-run. This main result holds even when intervention is not associated with (same-day) interest rate changes, and regardless of whether or not intervention is "secret" or reported in the news-wires. They also find that intervention was most likely to succeed when it was coordinated and large scale (amounts over USD 1 billion).
Using a time-series framework with GARCH(1,1) specifications for addressing the issue of effectiveness, Ito (2003) (2003) finds intervention was effective (i.e. the estimated coefficients are significant and of the "correct" sign). Additionally, his paper shows that coordinated intervention (by both the Fed and the BoJ) was more effective than unilateral intervention (BoJ only).
In his recent paper, Ito (2004) We observe intervention and its effects during a select sample period (typically of market turmoil), but not during more normal episodes. Hence, the value of a matching methodology is to "match up" economic circumstances that lead to intervention (similar probabilities of intervention), and differ only in that in one case intervention occurred and in another it didn't. Better estimates of the effectiveness of intervention may be obtained by using this methodology.
The analysis of Fatum and Hutchison (2004) consists of two parts. In the first part, logit models of the BoJ's decision to intervene are estimated. From these logit model estimates, the probability of intervention (a propensity score) for each day in the sample is derived. The sample is then split into a sub-sample of days when intervention actually occurred and a sub-sample of days when no intervention occurred. Regardless of whether or not intervention actually did occur on a given day, there is a uniquely defined intervention probability associated with each day in both sub-samples as well as a realized (day-to-day) change in the JPY/USD exchange rate. In the second part, a matching algorithm -the so-called "nearest neighbor" algorithm where each intervention observation is matched with the no-intervention observation that has the "nearest"
propensity score -is implemented and the average effect of intervention on exchange rates (using each algorithm separately) is examined, using difference-in-means tests.
The main findings of Fatum and Hutchison (2004) are summarized in Table 3 and the specific matching methods results are displayed in Table 4 . Analyzing the most recent 5 years of BoJ intervention data, the study finds that intervention was effective during the intervention operations that "stand alone" in the sense that intervention on a given day does not immediately succeed intervention on the previous day and is not succeeded by intervention on the following day) and first-day intervention operations (i.e. the first day of several consecutive days of intervention).
The described study finds intervention to be effective during a time-period of infrequent interventions while it finds intervention to be ineffective or even counterproductive during time-periods of very frequent intervention. Interestingly, these findings seem consistent with the time-series based study by Ito (2003) institutions' deposits in current accounts they hold with the BoJ ("current account balances" or CABs) was the primary operational target of Japanese monetary policy. This is the measure we employ in our analysis of daily sterilization operations. We complement the current account balance measure with the monetary base in the analysis of monthly and quarterly interactions between intervention and monetary policy.
Short-run Sterilization
In order to investigate whether BoJ interventions are systematically affecting the current account balance on a day-to-day basis, we carry out a time-series analysis of daily data.
Specifically, we regress the first-difference of the BoJ current account balance ( ) on a constant ( through third lag are significant in both regressions, the sign of the significant coefficients alternate from negative to positive to negative and it appears that these effects on the CAB cancel each other out. This is confirmed by the F-test of Sum Equals Zero, which for both regressions suggests that the cumulative effect of intervention on the CAB is zero.
In sum, this clearly suggests that intervention activity does not explain changes in the BOJ's CAB and, as noted by Speigel (2003) , there is little correlation between these two variables at a daily frequency.
Is the BOJ Responding to the Intervention Policy Set by the MOF?
The rapid increase in the Japanese base money at a time when the MOF/BOJ has undertaken prolonged large-scale intervention in support of the USD has caused speculations that the recent interventions are unsterilized over the course of months and quarters. For example, Spiegel (2003) , discussing a Nikkei Financial Daily article, notes that "the total value of interventions from the beginning of 2003 until the end of August matched almost exactly the increase in the Bank of Japan's current account balance over that period, suggesting that the Bank of Japan left the funds associated with its intervention activity in the market". Although we do not find a connection between intervention and the current account at the daily frequency, it is entirely possible that the two variables are highly correlated at lower frequencies, such as monthly or quarterly data. Table 6 , part A, and Figure 4 show the monthly totals of intervention juxtaposed against the monthly changes in the current account. Although both series are obviously trending upwards over the time-period under study, the two series do not appear highly Increases in the limit have since been approved by the Diet (Table 1) , and the repurchase of the securities was completed on schedule later in the year.
5.2
Where is base money expansion coming from?
The Bank of Japan is purchasing assets other than foreign currency in its expansion of the Clearly, the Bank of Japan expanded its balance sheet using instruments beyond traditional short-term government debt. This was likely a good strategy because shortterm government securities are "near money" in an environment of zero short-term interest rates and would not effectively provide monetary stimulus, i.e. amounting to purchases of "near money" (short-term government securities) from the private sector to create base money. Moreover, Table 6 shows that cumulated intervention from January 2003 to March 2004 --the period of heavy intervention by the BOJ signaling a change in policy--was about 35 trillion yen while the increase in the monetary base was less than half of that amount (16.8 trillion yen).
We look at previous episodes of heavy intervention in order to assess whether BOJ policy during 2003-04 was unusual, i.e. whether recent policy appears more responsive or coordinated with intervention operations compared to previous experience. Limited effectiveness of intervention in the most recent period, however, may also be associated with a high degree of sterilization. We consider institutional factors (how intervention is financed) and also statistically investigate whether current account balances set by the Bank of Japan are influenced by daily intervention operations. This analysis suggests that from a technical perspective the Bank of Japan has not allowed MOF intervention decisions to influence the day-to-day conduct of monetary policy.
In addition we do not find statistical evidence that the Bank of Japan has changed the direction of policy in response to large intervention operations in 2003-04. Base money growth was very rapid during this period but it was not associated with foreign asset purchases by the Bank of Japan. Moreover, cumulative foreign currency purchases by the MOF were more than twice as large as the increase in base money. Earlier episodes of intensive intervention were much more closely matched by base money increases than the 2003-04 period.
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